Two experiments tested whether innocent victims threaten observers' belief in a just world. In both experiments, participants viewed an innocent victim then performed a modified Stroop task in which they identified the color of several words presented for brief exposures (followed by a mask) on a computer screen. When the threat to justice beliefs was presumably highest, color-identification latencies were greater for justice-related words than for neutral words. In Experiment 2, under conditions of high threat, justice-related interference predicted participants' tendency to disassociate themselves from and derogate the victim. These findings suggest that innocent victims do threaten justice beliefs and responses to these victims may, at times, be attempts to reduce this threat. The methodology presented here may be applied to future investigations of defensive, counternormative processes reflecting people's concern with justice.
responses to a victim vary as a function of this supposed manipulation of threat. For example, an experimenter might manipulate whether an observed victim continues to suffer, then measure victim derogation as a possible response to the observed suffering. Continued suffering should be more threatening to the observer than should suffering that has ended (see e.g., Lerner & Simmons, 1966; Simons & Piliavin, 1972) . Therefore, greater victim derogation in the continued suffering condition (relative to the past suffering condition) would be interpreted as an attempt to resolve injustice (through rationalization in this case), thus preserving the belief in a just world. Therefore, it is inferred from attitudinal and behavioral reactions to the victim (i.e., presumed strategies for coping with threats to the belief in a just world) that the victim posed a threat to the observer's sense of justice. Although such research findings are often consistent with the idea that certain victims present a threat to justice beliefs and that responses to the victim are attempts to deal with that threat, there has been little attempt to measure the presumed intervening process. That is, few researchers have tried to show evidence that innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world by assessing the threat that is experienced before coping responses, such as blame and derogation, are fully engaged. The present studies are an attempt to uncover such evidence.
How might the threat to the belief in a just world be measured? Individuals' retrospective self-reports of their thoughts and emotions while observing an innocent victim might be suspect for several reasons. First, Lerner (1998; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999) has suggested that threats to the belief in a just world may often be experienced preconsciously; thus, observers may be unable to accurately report their relevant internal states. Second, these responses may be biased by social norms: The norm that one should feel sympathy for innocent victims, for example, may deter par-HAFER ticipants from reporting negative emotional reactions (such as feelings of threat). Third, these self-reports may reflect cognition and affect that have already been altered by justification of the victim's fate (e.g., victim derogation) rather than initial responses to the situation. Given these difficulties, in the present studies I attempted to test the extent to which innocent victims threaten the belief in a just world without relying on self-report data.
Toward this end, I borrowed from work on cognitive theories of psychopathology. Recent research on emotional disorders has shown that people with various emotional problems show an attentional bias to stimuli that represent the threatening object or situation (for a review, see Williams, Mathews, & MacLeod, 1996) . For example, socially anxious individuals are especially sensitive to stimuli related to social challenges, whereas individuals who are anxious about their health status or personal safety are especially sensitive to stimuli reminiscent of physical harm. A common way of demonstrating this bias toward stimuli that is of emotional concern is through the use of a modified or "emotional" Stroop task.
In a typical Stroop task, a person is asked to identify the color of the ink in which a stimulus is printed while he or she attempts to ignore the stimulus itself (for a review of Stroop research in general, see MacLeod, 1991) . The stimulus is either the name of a color or semantically meaningless (i.e., control stimuli, such as a row of Xs). For the color words, the ink color may be incompatible with the word, as in the word "green" written in red ink. People take longer to indicate the color of the ink when it is incompatible with the stimulus (e.g., "green" written in red ink) than when the stimulus is meaningless (e.g., Xs). A person's average latency in identifying the color of incompatible color words versus control stimuli is termed interference. Interference may also occur for words that are merely associated with specific colors and are written in incompatible ink, such as the word "sky" written in green. In general, whenever the meaning of a word is semantically activated, it is likely that the word will interfere with color identification.
In the research on emotional disorders, neutral words and words that are related to the overriding concern of the individual are presented (sometimes at very brief exposures) in different colors. For example, a group of individuals who are anxious about their personal health and safety may be presented neutral (or control) words such as "spoon" or "table," and words related to poor health or other negative physical events such as "cancer" or "hazard" (see e.g., Mathews & MacLeod, 1985; Mogg, Mathews, & Weinman, 1989) . The latency with which people identify the color of the words is recorded. This research has shown that people take longer to identify the color of words that are associated with whatever is of emotional concern (i.e., whatever is threatening) than the color of neutral words. For example, people who are anxious about their health or physical safety would take longer to identify the color of words like "cancer" and "hazard," than they would to identify the color of neutral words. These emotional Stroop effects have also been shown in nonclinical populations when the emotional concern is induced by the situation (e.g., Mogg, Mathews, Bird, & MacGregor-Morris, 1990) .
There is some disagreement about the exact nature of the mechanism underlying emotional Stroop effects. However, one possibility is that in the presence of threat mental categories relevant to the threat become primed, perhaps in preparation for coping with the situation (see Williams et al., 1996) , thus leading to increased activation of words associated with these threat-relevant categories. These words, as a result, are more likely to capture attention when a person is engaging in color identification during the Stroop task (see MacLeod & Hodder, 1998; Yantis, 1993) . Through this process, any stimuli that are of current affective concern to an individual should produce interference on a modified Stroop task, and this should occur whether the concern is chronic or induced by situational pressures.
For the present studies, a modified Stroop task was used to investigate the potential threat to justice beliefs caused by witnessing an innocent victim suffering. Participants were exposed to a videotaped news story of an innocent victim of assault and robbery. They then performed a modified Stroop task in which they were presented with different categories of words including justice-related and neutral words. If the injustice of an innocent victim suffering is particularly threatening to observers (i.e., the need to believe in a just world is threatened by these victims), then the justice-related words should represent the issue of most emotional concern: Consequently, color-identification latencies should be greater for these words than for the neutral words (Hypothesis 1).
The Stroop task also included additional categories of words: two categories of words (physical harm and social harm) that were indicative of negative events but were unrelated to the victim's story and one set of words that were related to the victim's story but that were not inherently related to negative events or to (injustice. I included the story-related words, as it was possible that these usually innocuous words might become associated with justice issues because they were relevant to the victim's story and, therefore, might show similar but weaker color-identification results compared with those expected for the justice-related words. The negative-event words were included to help test whether interference (if it occurred) would be specific to justice-related words and not to a more generalized effect that would apply to any words associated with negative events.
As mentioned earlier, certain characteristics of the victim or his or her situation are assumed to affect the extent to which the victim poses a threat to the belief in a just world. These variables should moderate the hypothesized tendency for color-identification latencies to be significantly greater for justice-related words versus neutral words, such that this expected difference should occur primarily under conditions of strong threat. In the present studies, I manipulated one of these variables-whether those responsible for the victimization were punished. When a specific individual is the cause of another's victimization, one way of restoring justice, at least in part, is through punishment of the offender or retribution. Retribution is seen as an especially appropriate response to harmdoing (compared with, for example, material compensation of the victim) when the offense could be interpreted as immoral (Tyler, Boeckmann, Smith, & Huo, 1997) , such as unprovoked physical assault. In the present studies, the perpetrators of the robbery and assault were either apprehended and jailed (retribution condition) or were not apprehended and would likely never be punished (no-retribution condition). I hypothesized that the contrast expected in Hypothesis 1 would primarily occur when there was no retribution for the offense (Hypothesis 2).
Study 1
Study 1 was an initial test of Hypotheses 1 and 2. Participants were shown a videotape of a victim of assault and robbery in which there was either retribution or no retribution. They then completed a Stroop task in which they were presented with several categories of words, including justice-related words. I predicted that color-identification latencies on the Stroop task would be greater for justice-related words than for neutral words (Hypothesis 1) and that this trend would occur primarily when there was no retribution for the offense (Hypothesis 2).
Method Participants
Participants were 66 undergraduate students (48 women and 18 men) at Brock University who participated in a study on "attitudes toward current events" in exchange for either course credit or $10. There were three students for whom English was not their first language. These students' responses were deleted from the final data set.
Procedure
Students (participating individually) were shown a videotape of several news stories taken from actual broadcasts. There were three innocuous stories followed by a set of commercials and, finally, the target story for these studies. The target story was created by editing parts of an actual news segment. New narration was written for the story and dubbed over top of the edited video display so that participants would believe they were watching an actual news clip narrated by a television reporter.
The target story involved a 19-year-old Canadian boy, referred to as Christopher, who was severely assaulted and robbed while he was travelling across North America. Each participant received one of two different versions of the story. These versions constituted the manipulation of retribution. In the retribution condition, the boy's assailants had been caught and sent to prison. In the no-retribution condition, the assailants had fled the country and would likely never be brought to trial.
After viewing the video, participants then performed a "distractor" task before continuing with the study. This task was the modified Stroop test. After the Stroop test, participants were told that they would answer questions about the news stories they had seen as well as general questions about the procedure of the study. They then completed a short questionnaire containing questions about the filler news clips (to keep the procedure consistent with the cover story), checks for the retribution manipulation, and, finally, questions designed to assess for knowledge of the purpose or hypotheses of the study as well as suspicion that the Stroop task and victim video were related. After completing this questionnaire, participants were informed that the experiment was over and were thoroughly debriefed.
Color-identification task. The Stroop task involved five categories of words with 10 words each. The first category of words was justice-related words (e.g., fair, unequal). None of these words were mentioned in the news clip. The second and third categories were physical harm words (e.g., torture, cancer) and social harm words (e.g., hostile, insult) drawn from past research on anxiety and information processing. None of these harm words were mentioned in the target story. A fourth category consisted of words related to major aspects of the target story that were not inherently related to either physical or social harm or to justice (e.g., railway, tent). Finally, there were 10 neutral words (e.g., widened, sorted). The words were matched across categories for length and frequency (Carroll, Davies, & Richman, 1971) . To reduce the possibility that participants would relate the Stroop task to the videotaped victim (and, thus, guess the actual purpose of the Stroop task), I attempted to decrease the salience of the word meanings by presenting the words for very brief exposures. Research has shown that stimuli presented very briefly, even stimuli that are below the threshold for conscious perception, can still affect attitudes and behavior (e.g., Bargh & Pietromonaco, 1982; Devine, 1989; Kunst-Wilson & Zajonc, 1980; Neuberg, 1988) . Words in the present study, then, were presented for only 16 ms followed by a mask (i.e., a row of asterisks with the same number of characters as the word). The word-mask stimuli were presented to the participant using MEL 1.0 software (Schneider, 1990) in random order, with the constraint that no word type (i.e., justice-related, story-related, physical harm, social harm, and neutral) appear on more than two consecutive trials. The words were presented in a randomly determined color from the set red, green, blue, and yellow, with the constraint that no color appear on more than two consecutive trials. Each trial consisted of the following elements: a 1-s delay, a fixation cross (i.e.,"+") appearing in the middle of the computer screen for 800 ms, then the word-mask stimulus. The mask stayed on the screen until the participant indicated the color of the word-mask display by pressing one of four colored keys on the computer keyboard. The next trial then began. Response latencies were recorded by the MEL program.
Participants were told that they would be presented with several stimulus presentations and that they were to indicate the color of each presentation as quickly and accurately as possible. They were told that during the task words would be presented very briefly and that they were to ignore the content of these words and simply indicate the color of the stimulus presentation. Six practice trials preceded the main task. The first four trials of the main task served as buffer trials and were therefore not analyzed.
Measures. The primary measures in this study were reaction time on the 40 trials in milliseconds and the manipulation checks for the retribution manipulation. For the first manipulation check, participants were asked to write down what they remembered about the perpetrators' fate. Answers were scored as correct or incorrect. Participants also rated on a 7-point scale, ranging from 1 {not at all) to 7 (totally), the extent to which they felt that justice had been served.
Results

Salience Check
As mentioned, words in the Stroop task were presented for only 16 ms (followed by a mask) in an attempt to reduce the average salience of word meanings. A separate sample of 20 students (all female psychology undergraduates with English as their first language) was used to test the extent to which the words and their meanings were, in fact, salient to participants in the study. These students watched either the retribution or the noretribution video (10 per condition), then performed a Stroop task similar to the one used in the actual study, except that on half the computer trials (randomly determined), immediately after they indicated the ink color, they were asked by the experimenter whether a word had been shown on that trial and, if so, if they could name the word. On average, these participants were aware that a word had been presented on 40% of the trials (all of which, in fact, did present a word) and could correctly name the word on 39% of the trials. Therefore, the words were difficult but not impossible to perceive consciously, indicating that the salience of word meanings was low (as intended).
Preliminary Analyses
Written checks for suspicion as well as oral responses during debriefing suggested that no participant guessed the true purpose of the study. Nor did any participant mention that the Stroop task was related to the videotape of the victim. Thus, the participants did not appear to consciously relate the words to the victim's story.
Two participants in the retribution condition reported that they did not remember what happened to the perpetrators. All other participants correctly reported the perpetrators' fate. Participants in the retribution condition reported that justice was served (M = 5.13) significantly more strongly than did participants in the no-retribution condition (M = 1.48), t(42) = 11.27, p < .001. Thus, the manipulation of retribution was successful.
Color-Identification Latencies
The mean number of color-identification errors (not including practice or buffer trials) across participants was 0.54 (range = 0 to 4). Trials on which errors were made were excluded from analyses. Response latencies that were more than three standard deviations from each participant's mean were also deleted (for similar procedures, see Mogg, Bradley, Williams, & Mathews, 1993; Mogg et al., 1990) . In total, about 2% of color-identification responses were deleted. The percentage of responses deleted was about equal across conditions. All remaining color-identification latencies were subjected to a natural log transformation before analyses (see e.g., Higgins, Van Hook, & Dorfman, 1988; Lambert, 1995; Lambert, Barton, Lickel, & Wells, 1998) . This transformation is suggested for variables that are positively skewed, such as reaction times (Kirk, 1995) . All analyses of reaction time data mentioned in the Results section were conducted using these transformed latencies, although Table 1 shows data that is based on raw reaction times for ease of interpretation.
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A 5 (word category: justice-related, story-related, physical harm, social harm, neutral) X 2 (retribution vs. no retribution) mixed analysis of variance (ANOVA), with word category as the within-subjects variable and retribution as the between-subjects variable, was conducted on the mean transformed coloridentification latencies (see Table 1 for the group means). This analysis yielded a main effect for word category, F(4, 244) = 4.02, p < .01. Simple contrasts showed that, as predicted in Hypothesis 1, color-identification latencies were greater for justice-related words than they were for neutral words, F(l, 61) = 6.44, p < .05. The latencies for the other word categories (i.e., story-related, Note. Color-identification latencies are in milliseconds.
physical harm, social harm) were not significantly different from those for neutral words (and all contrasts showed differences in the direction of facilitation rather than interference; all p& > .10). There was no significant main effect for the retribution manipulation.
The main effect for word category was subsumed by a marginal interaction between word category and retribution, F(4, 244) = 2.39, p = .05. To investigate this interaction further and to address Hypothesis 2 more directly, I tested whether the contrast between the mean latency for justice-related words versus neutral words differed depending on the retribution manipulation. This treatment-contrast interaction was significant, F(l, 61) = 4.28, p < .05. Similar treatment-contrast interactions involving storyrelated, physical harm, and social harm words (vs. neutral) were nonsignificant (allps > .10). Tests of the mean latency for justicerelated versus neutral words for each level of the retribution manipulation indicated that, consistent with Hypothesis 2, the mean latency for justice-related words was significantly greater than for neutral words in the no-retribution condition, f(244) = 3.26, p < .01. In the retribution condition, this difference was nonsignificant (and in the opposite direction; p > .10).
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Discussion
If innocent victims are threatening to the belief in a just world, then participants should be slower to respond to words indicative of that threat, compared with neutral words, on a modified Stroop color-identification task (Hypothesis 1). This reasoning was supported. As predicted, participants showed greater coloridentification latencies for justice-related words than for neutral words after viewing an innocent victim. Also, latencies for the three other word categories (story-related, physical harm, and social harm words) were not significantly different from neutral. These results are evidence that the threat posed by the innocent victim was specific to justice beliefs.
The expected contrast between justice-related and neutral coloridentification latencies should occur primarily under conditions that presumably increase the threat to the belief in a just world (Hypothesis 2). Consistent with this hypothesis, the above difference between the mean latency for justice-related words versus neutral words was significant only when there was no retribution for the victim's suffering and not when there was retribution.
Given that the results in Study 1 are novel (no other research has applied the notion of emotional Stroop interference to the domain of justice beliefs), a second study was conducted to attempt to replicate the findings reported above. Study 2 also tested an extension of the reasoning underlying Study 1.1 have reasoned that the extent of Stroop interference for justice-related words (and the activation and heightened attention to these words that this interference presumably reflects) is indicative of the magnitude of threat to the belief in a just world-a threat that requires resolution. If this interference does indeed reflect such a threat, then the magnitude of the interference for justice-related words should be related to later attempts to resolve the injustice (and, therefore, reduce the threat). In Study 2, participants observed the same victim and performed the same Stroop task as in Study 1. After the Stroop task, however, they also completed a measure of the extent to which they disassociated themselves from the victim and the extent to which they derogated the victim's character. Disassociation and derogation are two possible strategies for dealing with observed injustice that have been studied in previous research (see Lerner & Miller, 1978) . Observers may disassociate themselves from an innocent victim by claiming that they are unlike the victim personally (e.g., in terms of attitudes and personality characteristics), by claiming that their general situation is unlike that of the victim, or by affirming more directly that a similar fate could not happen to them. By so doing, observers can convince themselves that the same fate will not befall them, thus reducing the threat posed by the victim. By derogating the victim's character, observers can rationalize that the victim, at least in part, deserved what happened to him or her because he or she is an unworthy or undesirable person, again reducing the threat the victim poses to the belief in a just world. If the Stroop interference in the present research is indicative of the magnitude of this threat, and if measures of disassociation and derogation reflect subsequent attempts to deal with the threat, then interference on the justicerelated words should be associated with greater disassociation from the victim and greater victim derogation (Hypothesis 3). I also expected that this relationship would be moderated by whether there was retribution for the crime (i.e., a variable that should presumably increase the threat the victim poses to the belief in a just world) such that the relationship would occur primarily under conditions of high threat (Hypothesis 4).
Study 2 the victim on a scale ranging from 1 (very negative) to 7 (very positive).
The overall impression and careful-careless items were reverse scored, and then all three measures were summed to yield a composite score for derogation, with higher scores indicating more derogation.
Method Participants
Participants were 41 female psychology undergraduate students at Brock University who volunteered for a study on attitudes toward current events in exchange for either course credit or $10. The data for one participant was deleted because her first language was not English.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as for Study 1 except that the questionnaire participants completed after performing the Stroop task included items assessing their reactions to the victim. These items were the first in the questionnaire.
Two items assessed the extent to which participants disassociated themselves from the innocent victim: "How similar would you say Christopher's attitudes and personality characteristics are to your own?" and "How likely do you think it is that a mugging and/or assault might sometime happen to you?" These two items were reverse keyed and summed to create an overall measure of disassociation, with higher scores meaning more disassociation. Three items assessed the extent to which participants derogated the victim's character. Participants rated the extent to which they saw the victim as, in general, a responsible or irresponsible person and the extent to which they saw him as a careful or careless person. These items were rated on 7-point scales ranging from 1 (careless or responsible) to 7 (careful or irresponsible). Participants also rated their overall impression of
Results
Manipulation Checks
Eighteen out of 20 participants in the retribution condition and all participants in the no-retribution condition correctly indicated what had happened to the perpetrators. Participants in the retribution condition reported that justice was served (M = 4.60) significantly more strongly than did participants in the no-retribution condition (M = 1.60), f(38) = 7.71, p < .001. Thus, the manipulation of retribution was successful.
Color-Identification Latencies
The mean number of color-identification errors (not including practice or buffer trials) across participants was 0.65 (range = 0 to 2). Trials on which errors were made were excluded from analyses as were response latencies that were more than three standard deviations from each participant's mean. In total, about 2% of color-identification latencies were deleted and the percentage of deletions did not vary by condition. All remaining values were subjected to a natural log transformation before analyses, although Table 2 presents raw data. 4 The mean color-identification latencies for each word category within the retribution conditions are presented in Table 2 . The means that are based on transformed reaction times were analyzed with a 5 (word category) X 2 (retribution vs. no retribution) mixed ANOVA, with word category as the within-subjects variable and retribution as the between-subjects variable. This analysis yielded a marginally significant main effect for word category, F(3.44, 128.56) = 2.22, p = .08. 5 Simple contrasts showed that, as expected, color-identification latencies for justice-related words were significantly greater than they were for neutral words, F(l, 38) = 6.31, p < .05. Latencies for story-related, physical harm, and social harm words were not significantly different from neutral words (all ps > .10). No significant main effect emerged for the retribution manipulation.
The overall ANOVA also revealed a significant interaction between word category and retribution, F(3.38, 128.56) = 3.59, p < .05. To address Hypothesis 2, I tested the interaction between the retribution manipulation and the contrast between the mean latencies for justice-related versus neutral words. This treatmentcontrast interaction was significant, F(l, 38) = 6.66, p < .05. Similar treatment-contrast interactions involving the mean latencies for story-related words, physical harm, and social harm words (vs. neutral words) were nonsignificant (all ps > .10). Tests of the justice-related versus neutral word contrast for each level of the retribution manipulation revealed that, as predicted, the mean latency for justice-related words was significantly greater than the mean latency for neutral words when there was no retribution for the crime, f(152) = 3.35, p < .01. The mean latency for justicerelated words was not significantly different from (and tended to be less than) the mean latency for neutral words when there was retribution (p > .10).
Interference and Reactions to the Victim
Interference scores for each participant were calculated for justice-related, story-related, physical harm, and social harm words by subtracting that individual's mean log-transformed coloridentification latency for neutral words from her mean logtransformed latency for the relevant target word category.
6 Consistent with Hypothesis 3, justice-related interference was, overall, significantly correlated with disassociation from the victim (r = .27, p < .05) and marginally correlated with derogation (r = .26, p = .05). None of the other interference scores (i.e., story-related, physical harm, social harm) were significantly correlated with reactions to the victim.
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To test the hypothesis that the relations between justice-related interference and reactions to the victim would be particularly strong or only apply under high threat conditions (Hypothesis 4), multiple regressions were conducted in which the retribution manipulation (dummy coded) and justice-related interference scores were force entered into the first step of the equation and the interaction between these two variables was force entered into the second step. Separate regression equations were calculated to predict disassociation and victim derogation. As hypothesized, when the criterion was disassociation from the victim, there was a significant interaction between justice-related interference and retribution, t(36) = 2.14, p < .05. An examination of within-cell correlations indicated that, consistent with Hypothesis 4, justicerelated interference was reliably associated with more disassociation from the victim when there was no retribution (r = .48, p < .05) but not when there was retribution (r = -.17, ns). Similarly, the regression with victim derogation as the criterion yielded a significant Justice-Related Interference X Retribution interaction, f(36) = 2.08, p < .05. Consistent with Hypothesis 4, justicerelated interference was significantly associated with more victim derogation when the perpetrators had escaped punishment (r = .52, p < .01) but not when they had been punished for their crime (r = -.11, ns). Similar multiple regression analyses to those reported above involving the other interference scores did not yield any significant interaction effects. 8 ' 9
Discussion
Participants were slower to identify the colors of stimulus displays involving justice-related words than they were the colors of displays involving neutral words, after observing an innocent victim (Hypothesis 1). This interference effect was not significant for any other category of words.
Again, these effects occurred primarily when the magnitude of the threat to the belief in a just world was presumably highest (i.e., when there was no retribution for the victim's suffering; Hypothesis 2). Not only then do observers of innocent suffering show interference that is unique to justice-related words, but this effect is also primarily found in the supposedly "high threat" condition. This is strong evidence that color-identification latencies on the Stroop task reflect the threat the innocent victim poses to the belief in a just world.
Even more evidence for this presumption comes from the fact that the more interference observers showed on the justice-related words, the more they derogated the victim's character, and the more they disassociated themselves from the victim (Hypothesis 3), and this occurred primarily when the victim supposedly posed a strong threat to the belief in a just world (Hypothesis 4). Interference scores for other categories of words were not significantly associated with responses to the victim, either overall or in interaction with the retribution manipulation. Thus, it seems that the innocent victim posed a threat specifically to participants' belief in a just world, and this threat was dealt with, in part, by rationalizing the victim's fate to reduce the appearance of injustice and by disassociating themselves from the victim, thereby assuring themselves that a similar fate could not happen to them.
General Discussion
The purpose of the present investigation was to test the extent to which observers of innocent victims are threatened by the injustice of the victim's suffering. Participants performed a modified Stroop 6 Note that some of these difference scores actually show "facilitation" (i.e., latencies for the word category of interest that are less than the latencies for neutral words). For ease of expression, however, all these scores will be referred to as interference scores.
7 All significance tests in this section are one-tailed, because they test a priori predictions.
8 Although I was primarily interested in the interaction effects for these analyses, two marginally significant main effects also emerged. For both the analysis involving disassociation and that involving derogation there was a marginally significant effect for justice-related interference, *(36) = 1.78, p = .08, and ((36) = 1.90, p = .07, respectively. These effects are consistent with the correlations described at the beginning of this section. There were no significant main effects for the retribution manipulation. Note that, despite the lack of main effects for this manipulation, Hypothesis 4 was still supported by the correlational analyses showing that justice-related interference predicts derogation or disassociation within the no-retribution condition.
9 It is possible that the justice-related words in the Stroop task had the effect of increasing any existing threat to the belief in a just world by further priming the category of (injustice. This may have led to greater victim derogation or disassociation than might have been the case in the absence of the Stroop task. Such a possibility could be tested in the future by including a Stroop/no-Stroop manipulation. task after viewing a videotaped victim of crime. Research in the area of psychopathology has shown that people show interference on such a modified (or emotional) Stroop task for stimuli representing a salient threat, such as when a socially anxious individual shows interference for words associated with social threat (e.g., "embarrassment," "mistake"). Similarly, in the present study, observers of the innocent victim showed interference for justicerelated words, suggesting that the injustice of the victim's suffering posed a threat to observers. These findings are consistent with Lerner's (1980) notion of the belief in a just world. Innocent victims presumably threaten the belief in a just world, because they provide evidence that people may not reap their just desserts.
These basic trends were modified according to whether those responsible for the victim's suffering were punished, a variable that should, theoretically, influence the magnitude of the threat to justice beliefs. In both studies, the predicted overall effects were found primarily when there was no retribution for the crime rather than when the perpetrators had been caught and punished. These results increase confidence that reaction times on the Stroop task tapped into the threat to the belief in a just world posed by the innocent victim.
It is important to note that similar results were not found for words that were unrelated to justice. In both studies, coloridentification latencies for physical harm and social harm words were not significantly different than those for neutral words, and these contrasts did not significantly interact with the manipulation of threat to the belief in a just world (i.e., retribution). These findings suggest that the victim increased concern specifically with justice and not with harm (or negative outcomes) in general. Color-identification latencies for words associated with the victim's story that were not inherently connected to justice or harm also did not mimic the effects for justice-related words, suggesting that these inherently neutral words, although related to the victim's story, did not become strongly associated with a threat to justice beliefs.
As suggested by recent accounts of emotional Stroop effects (see Williams et al., 1996) , observing the victim may have caused the concept of justice to be primed, perhaps reflecting the mobilization of cognitive resources in preparation for coping with the threat posed by the victim. Words associated with justice were, therefore, activated, leading to an increased tendency for the justice-related words (versus the neutral words) to capture attention during the Stroop task. The result of this process is the interference shown for justice-related words while participants are attempting to identify the color of stimuli. If interference for justice-related words is, as suggested, the ultimate result of cognitive resources being mobilized in preparation for dealing with a threat to the belief in a just world, then subsequent strategies for dealing with that threat should be associated with justice-related interference. In Study 2, interference for justice-related words was related to disassociation from the victim as well as to derogation of the victim's character, and these relations occurred primarily when there was no retribution. Again, the same results did not occur for interference on story-related, physical harm, or social harm words. These results suggest that people may have dealt with the threat to their justice beliefs (as evidenced by the justice-related interference) by rationalizing that the victim deserved his fate because he was an unlikable, unworthy individual and/or by disassociating themselves from the victim, which would allow them to assert that a similar fate could not befall them in the future.
The results of these studies are relatively strong evidence that, when there was no retribution for the crime, it was the injustice of the victim's story that was disturbing to observers, and victim derogation and disassociation were strategies for dealing with this injustice. Was the injustice in the no-rettibution condition disturbing, however, because it posed a threat to observers' belief in a just world (as suggested in this article) or did this scenario raise other concerns? For example, the unresolved injustice may have threatened observers' belief in personal control. Perhaps the assault and robbery was perceived primarily as a violation of personal control over one's outcomes. If so, the punishment of the perpetrators in the retribution condition may have been interpreted as regaining control of the situation as opposed to maintaining or restoring a belief in a just world. The injustice in the no-retribution condition may, therefore, have been disturbing (and thus led to Stroop interference on the justice-related words), because it implied a lack of personal control over one's outcomes.
Although it appears plausible that the justice-related interference reflected control concerns, the results involving victim derogation are more difficult to explain in terms of a threat to personal control beliefs. In Study 2, interference for the justice-related words was related to derogation of the victim in the no-retribution condition. A belief in a just world interpretation of these data is that derogating the victim's character helped maintain a belief in a just world by recasting the victimization as deserved and, therefore, compatible with a just world. It is somewhat less clear how resolving the injustice in this particular manner (i.e., by derogating the victim's character) can reinstitute a belief in personal control. The victim, although now deserving of his fate (because he is an inherently bad person), remains not in control of his outcomes. There is some past evidence that reactions to victims such as holding them responsible for their fate, blaming them, and derogating their character are related more to justice beliefs than to beliefs about personal control. Maes (1994) , for example, found that individual differences in the strength of the belief in immanent justice was a more important predictor of these responses to victims than were individual differences in control beliefs. In sum, the argument that the results of the present investigation can be accounted for in terms of control beliefs is weak.
Perhaps a more plausible alternative explanation for why the unresolved injustice was disturbing is that it represented a breakdown in the social order (the perpetrators eluded the justice system, an important element of societal stability). Derogation of the victim's character might have reduced the threat of social disorder by abrogating the need for restitution or retribution (which, presumably, becomes unnecessary if the victim deserved his treatment in some way) and, thus, the need for the justice system to exert its power. The failure of such an institution to respond to the situation is not threatening if such a response would be inappropriate. Future studies could test this reasoning by including in the Stroop task a category of words related to social order but not to justice per se (e.g., order, safety). Alternatively, the presumed manipulation of threat to the belief in a just world could be altered so that the social order (e.g., the formal legal system) is less salient. For example, as in some previous studies, one could attempt to manipulate the threat to the belief in a just world by varying the innocence of the victim (see Hafer, in press; Lerner & Miller, 1978) . Despite the alternative explanations for the Stroop interference on justicerelated words, it is important to reiterate that these data do give strong evidence that the injustice aspect of the victim's situation is of concern and that derogation and disassociation are responses to that concern.
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The methodology presented here is an important contribution to the social justice literature. Not only does the interference data corroborate past research on the belief in a just world and responses to innocent victims, research which typically inferred the presence of a threat to justice beliefs from supposed coping responses to this threat, but the Stroop methodology may be a way of assessing just-world effects that are too subtle to detect with measures of coping. For example, measures of victim blame and derogation do not always show the pattern of results expected from just-world reasoning (Hafer, in press; Maes, 1998) . There are at least two reasons for these failures. First, there is probably a norm of sympathy for innocent victims; thus, it is likely that people are reluctant to report negative responses toward these individuals, such as blame and derogation. Also, there are many different strategies for maintaining the belief in a just world in the face of threat, aside from blame and derogation (Lemer, 1980) ; which strategy is used likely depends on a variety of situational factors (see Maes, 1998) as well as dispositions of the observer; thus, it may be difficult to predict in advance which will be the strategy of choice for responding to a given victim and, therefore, which strategy (or strategies) to measure in a given study. Even if significant effects are not obtained for a particular coping response, however, the expected interference may still appear on the Stroop task, showing evidence that a threat to the observer's belief in a just world did occur, despite null results for measures of coping responses.
Although the Stroop methodology in the present study was used within the context of the belief in a just world, similar procedures could be used to study other justice-related issues that are difficult to investigate with more traditional measures. Recently, Lemer (1998; Lerner & Goldberg, 1999) has suggested that there are two forms of the justice motive corresponding roughly to the rational versus experiential conceptual systems proposed by Epstein, Lipson, Holstein, and Huh (1992) and to Shweder and Haidt's (1994) moral reasoning versus moral intuition. First, people's attitudes and behaviors can be guided by relatively conscious deliberations about society's norms regarding how we should perceive and respond to injustice (similar to the rational system and moral reasoning). The second form of the justice motive, according to Lerner, is characterized by more preconscious, defensive processes often resulting in counternormative behavior (similar to the experiential system and moral intuition). This latter form of the justice motive is exemplified by early work on the belief in a just world (a belief we all, presumably, hold but do not often ponder consciously) and victim derogation (a counternormative and defensive response to threats to the belief in a just world). In recent years, the social justice literature has moved away from such investigations to the study of more deliberative, normative processes (e.g., Feather, 1998; Mitchell, Tetlock, Mellers, & Ordonez, 1993; Olson & Hafer, 1996; Skitka & Tetlock, 1992) , evidence of which can be gathered through self-report questionnaires that directly ask respondents about the issue of concern. If we are to balance this current focus with research on processes that are more defensive, counternormative and, perhaps, preconscious (e.g., threats to the belief in a just world and victim derogation), then we need to use methods that are alternative to direct self-report. The present study provides one such alternative method.
Future research should test the extent to which the present findings generalize to different victims (e.g., varying in type of victimization, age, gender) as well as to people's responses to their own misfortune (for recent work on the just-world belief and responses to one's own misfortune, see Benson & Ritter, 1990; Dalbert, 1993 Dalbert, , 1998 Hafer & Olson, 1989 . Also, future research could examine the relation between Stroop interference on justice-related words and other ways of responding to innocent suffering such as offering compensation, blaming the victim's behavior, or downplaying the extent of harm (see Lerner, 1980; Reichle, Schneider, & Montada, 1998) .
Given the great number of stories of innocent people suffering we encounter in our daily lives, how we respond to these portrayals is important to study. The present research uses a novel methodology to corroborate and strengthen previous work suggesting that the injustice aspect of these portrayals is threatening, and this threat may motivate ways of responding to the victim that allow us to resolve the injustice. Such research methodologies provide an alternative to direct self-report measures and, therefore, may prove useful in future investigations of the more defensive, preconscious, and counternormative processes involved in our concern with justice.
